March 16th, 2017 04:20

Add to manifesto: Ban use of EVMs in elections and go back to paper ballots

Pirate Praveen
Pirate Praveen Public Seen by 436

EVMs cannot be trusted because there is no way to verify the results. We have no idea how the software is written and even if the source code is available, we cannot verify if the same binary is running on the machine.

Update: At the minimum there has to be a paper trail which can be machine counted

Some discussion about technology and voting https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/21/pirate-party-online-voting-4chan-government

Manoj Karingamadathil

Manoj Karingamadathil March 16th, 2017 04:40

പൊതുജനത്തിന് സംശയമുള്ള സ്ഥിതിക്ക് സർക്കാർ മെഷിന്റെ ഡിസൈൻ പരസ്യമാക്കണം. കോഡ് സ്വതന്ത്രമായി പരിശോധിക്കുന്നതിനുള്ള സൗകര്യം പൊതുജനത്തിന് കൊടുക്കണം.

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen March 16th, 2017 04:51

Translation: Since people have doubts about EVMs, govt should publish the EVM design. People should also be able to verify the source code.

As I said above, even if the source code is available, how do we know if the binary flashed into the machine is built from the same source code?

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen March 16th, 2017 04:59

But yes, if the hardware design and software is available to public, we have a better chance of finding the backdoors/vulnerabilities.

Alexander Gounder

Alexander Gounder March 16th, 2017 05:58

I think there could be simpler solution, paper receipts printed after casting of vote which can be checked by the voter and dropped into a ballot box. If a candidate feels the EVM results are tampered he can ask for a manual recount.

This could furthered by printing to receipts, one for the paper ballot and the other for the voter to keep or give to his candidate for reference.

Sooraj Kenoth

Sooraj Kenoth March 16th, 2017 07:20

I deny @manojkmohan opinion. Even if the code or hardware is public we don't have any mechanism to ensure the code inside the machine is the same as published.

I support @gounder 's opinion. We don't need to ban the tools or systems. We need a mechanism to ensure the system is fool proof.

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen March 16th, 2017 07:25

I don't think the receipts are a good idea, it will take away the secrecy. So just having a paper trail, that can be verified by the voter should be enough.

Sooraj Kenoth

Sooraj Kenoth March 16th, 2017 08:12

We can have a micro printer(Not thermal) connected to the EVM. It will print the exact sign of the candidate who got once vote. So one card will contain only one sign, so voter can confirms his vote. The voter can put the card in ballet secretly. When ever there is a allegation we can count the number of cards with the help of a scanning Machine.


vik@hamara March 16th, 2017 17:54

It seems like going backwards, I don't think counting paper ballots was always accurate / safe / not corruptable. How about defining votes as transactions and using blockchain to store them. These guys are doing it: https://followmyvote.com/online-voting-technology/blockchain-technology/


Bady March 17th, 2017 04:14

An article on the same topic that appeared in today's (17/03/2017) mathrubhumi newspaper:

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen March 17th, 2017 08:49

This could be an option. The question is about being able to verify the results. But doesn't blockchain technology require internet connection everywhere? Then securing each node can be a challenge. It will need more analysis and can be considered for future. But that is not a reason to support current unverifiable EVMs.

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen March 17th, 2017 08:58

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen started a proposal March 19th, 2017 05:59

Add to manifesto: Restore trust in election process Closed 11:31am - Wednesday 29 Mar 2017

by Pirate Praveen April 25th, 2017 05:21

We have consensus here and 4 permanent members voted for the proposal

Election process should be beyond doubt and being able to verify the correctness of vote count is a basic requirement. Current Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) does not have a verifications mechanism and makes any kind of tampering impossible to detect. We have to blindly trust there was no tampering.

We will ensure that
a) all EVMs will have a Voter Verifiable Paper Trail (a receipt printed by the EVM which can be put into a ballot box)
b) go back to paper ballots
to restore trust in election process.

With a paper trail, voters can verify the correctness of their votes and a manual counting of these paper receipts will make it possible to detect any kind of tampering in case of doubt.

Agree - 7
Abstain - 0
Disagree - 0
Block - 0
7 people have voted (0%)
Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen
March 19th, 2017 06:01

yes, trust in election process is required for democracy and being able to verify results is critical in that.


March 19th, 2017 06:06

Paper trail seems to be a good idea!


Shanavas M
March 19th, 2017 06:11

Great idea

Jackson Isaac

Jackson Isaac
March 20th, 2017 05:48


March 20th, 2017 17:08


[deactivated account]
March 21st, 2017 05:19

If not ban, atleast a paper trail would be better for accountability

Manohar Elavarthi

Manohar Elavarthi
March 22nd, 2017 03:48

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen April 5th, 2017 10:12

Now with video, the evidence of tampering http://www.deccanherald.com/content/604227/evm-registers-only-bjp-votes.html (just adding here for completeness).


Bady April 16th, 2017 19:46

this has been added to the Manifesto (page 3)

Pirate Praveen

Pirate Praveen May 14th, 2017 11:57

In the last friday's call we discussed about AAP's demonstration of voter machine fraud. I thought it would a good idea for us to write an article to clarify our opposition to current form of EVMs, publish it on our site and spread it widely. I have started it here, please contribute https://pad.disroot.org/p/EVMs

Pirate Radio Podcasts

Pirate Radio Podcasts July 22nd, 2017 12:27

HELL YA! Damn EVMs can be HACKED in under a minute - utterly mind boggling