Loomio
Thu 16 Mar 2017 4:20AM

Add to manifesto: Ban use of EVMs in elections and go back to paper ballots

PP Pirate Praveen Public Seen by 56

EVMs cannot be trusted because there is no way to verify the results. We have no idea how the software is written and even if the source code is available, we cannot verify if the same binary is running on the machine.

Update: At the minimum there has to be a paper trail which can be machine counted

Some discussion about technology and voting https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/21/pirate-party-online-voting-4chan-government

MK

Manoj Karingamadathil Thu 16 Mar 2017 4:40AM

പൊതുജനത്തിന് സംശയമുള്ള സ്ഥിതിക്ക് സർക്കാർ മെഷിന്റെ ഡിസൈൻ പരസ്യമാക്കണം. കോഡ് സ്വതന്ത്രമായി പരിശോധിക്കുന്നതിനുള്ള സൗകര്യം പൊതുജനത്തിന് കൊടുക്കണം.
https://www.facebook.com/vu2swx/posts/10212531663232586?pnref=story

PP

Pirate Praveen Thu 16 Mar 2017 4:51AM

Translation: Since people have doubts about EVMs, govt should publish the EVM design. People should also be able to verify the source code.

As I said above, even if the source code is available, how do we know if the binary flashed into the machine is built from the same source code?

PP

Pirate Praveen Thu 16 Mar 2017 4:59AM

But yes, if the hardware design and software is available to public, we have a better chance of finding the backdoors/vulnerabilities.

AG

Alexander Gounder Thu 16 Mar 2017 5:58AM

I think there could be simpler solution, paper receipts printed after casting of vote which can be checked by the voter and dropped into a ballot box. If a candidate feels the EVM results are tampered he can ask for a manual recount.

This could furthered by printing to receipts, one for the paper ballot and the other for the voter to keep or give to his candidate for reference.

PP

Pirate Praveen Thu 16 Mar 2017 7:25AM

I don't think the receipts are a good idea, it will take away the secrecy. So just having a paper trail, that can be verified by the voter should be enough.

SK

Sooraj Kenoth Thu 16 Mar 2017 7:20AM

I deny @manojkmohan opinion. Even if the code or hardware is public we don't have any mechanism to ensure the code inside the machine is the same as published.

I support @gounder 's opinion. We don't need to ban the tools or systems. We need a mechanism to ensure the system is fool proof.

SK

Sooraj Kenoth Thu 16 Mar 2017 8:12AM

We can have a micro printer(Not thermal) connected to the EVM. It will print the exact sign of the candidate who got once vote. So one card will contain only one sign, so voter can confirms his vote. The voter can put the card in ballet secretly. When ever there is a allegation we can count the number of cards with the help of a scanning Machine.

V

vik@hamara Thu 16 Mar 2017 5:54PM

It seems like going backwards, I don't think counting paper ballots was always accurate / safe / not corruptable. How about defining votes as transactions and using blockchain to store them. These guys are doing it: https://followmyvote.com/online-voting-technology/blockchain-technology/

PP

Pirate Praveen Fri 17 Mar 2017 8:49AM

This could be an option. The question is about being able to verify the results. But doesn't blockchain technology require internet connection everywhere? Then securing each node can be a challenge. It will need more analysis and can be considered for future. But that is not a reason to support current unverifiable EVMs.

B

Bady Fri 17 Mar 2017 4:14AM

An article on the same topic that appeared in today's (17/03/2017) mathrubhumi newspaper:
http://digitalpaper.mathrubhumi.com/m/1138644/Thrissur/17-March-2016#issue/8/1

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