Paper ballots or voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) can enable independant verification option. But we should really verify it when there is a doubt. > My argument is not that evms in their current state is better than ballets but than as time goes by people will find more and more ways to trick the system and our only option is to keep improving and I feel like evm's have much more space for improvement than paper ballots.
From a point of view of trust, evm is never a better option than ballot to begin with. It only brings efficiency at the cost of trust. With ballots, we don't have to trust who is making the ballots, but with EVMs we have to trust blindly. Ballot tampering requires physical intervention. With EVMs we can't detect tampering, we really don't have the source code and no way to verify if the source code is actually running in it even if source is available (Volksvagon cheating). If there are extra chips, we would not even know. (Link to Super Micro hacking). Anything that requires blindly trusting without independently verifying the result is a no go. If paper output is different from what the machine actually recorded, independent counting will bring that out. If the paper is printed differently, the voter will come to know it immedialy. This actually adds two factors, they will have to tamper machines first and then the papers.